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Surfing the Web For Copyright Law: 
Why Infringement Claims are All Wet 
 
Jessica Richardson 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine you are about to go on a trip to Seattle, a city you 
have never visited.  You will have a lot of free time in Seattle, 
so you turn to the fastest, easiest, most convenient way to 
receive current and accurate information: the Internet.  You 
settle down at your personal computer in the den at home and 
dial up your local Internet Service Provider.  Unsure of where 
to find the information you need, you type in the address for 
Yahoo!1 and begin your search.  You enter the name of the city, 
and within seconds a list of possible Web pages that may be of 
interest to you appears.  With one point and click of the mouse, 
you instruct your computer to display the Seattle Sidewalk 
site,2 so that you may “virtually” explore the city.3  You browse 
restaurant reviews, hotel availability, museum exhibits, and 
theater events.  You are thrilled to find that your favorite band 
will be playing while you are visiting Seattle.  Conveniently, 
the Seattle Sidewalk Web page provides a hyperlink to 
 
 1. See Yahoo! (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.yahoo.com>. 
 2. See Seattle Sidewalk (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.seattle. 
sidewalk.com>. 
 3. Typing in <www.seattle.sidewalk.com> will no longer take users to 
that specific location, but rather to <www.msn.citysearch.com/?brand= 
sidewalk>, a similar guide to Seattle’s entertainment and events.  In the fall of 
2000, Microsoft sold the Sidewalk series to Ticketmaster Online-Citysearch.  
Microsoft retained rights to buying guides and business directories, which now 
appear through the MSN network.  See Bob Tedeschi, Microsoft Selling City 
Guides to Ticketmaster for $240 Million, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1999) 
<http://nytimes.qpass.com/qpass-archives>.  This Note describes the 
relationship of the companies and the functioning of their Web sites as they 
existed prior to Ticketmaster’s acquisition of the Sidewalk series.  Although 
Microsoft has renamed its site, and Ticketmaster now owns the Sidewalk 
series, the formerly adversarial relationship between the two companies 
nonetheless provides an ideal framework for the analysis of copyright issues 
arising from unauthorized deep linking on the Internet. 
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Ticketmaster,4 where you can purchase your ticket.  One more 
click and a ticket order page appears, the Ticketmaster logo at 
the top and the convenient credit card entry at the bottom.  You 
agree to pay the ticket price and the hefty Ticketmaster 
charges, order your tickets, and log off the Internet, content to 
have stumbled upon the concert information and excited to 
have purchased tickets. 
Little do you know that Ticketmaster would argue you 
have been breaking the law by simply clicking on links and 
browsing the Web.5  This note argues that “normal” hyperlinks, 
Hypertext Reference links, do not create a viable cause of 
action for copyright infringement.  Part I describes the history 
and the function of the Internet and specifically details how 
hyperlinks work as the primary means of connecting and 
retrieving electronic documents viewed on the Web.  Part II 
describes principles of copyright law and how they currently 
apply to the Internet.  Part III applies copyright law to a 
situation involving hyperlinks that Microsoft created which 
allowed users to access the ticket order page of Ticketmaster 
Online directly.  Through analysis of a common situation 
occurring on the Internet, this note proposes that neither the 
Internet Service Provider, in facilitating access to the Web and 
allowing the creation of hyperlinks, nor the link creator, in 
designing hyperlinks that connect Web sites, nor the individual 
user, in locating and viewing Web sites via hyperlink 
connections, should be held liable for copyright infringement. 
 
I. TECHNOLOGY OF HYPERTEXT LINKS ON  
THE INTERNET 
 
The U.S. government created the Internet in 1965 in order 
to connect the Defense Department with radio and satellite 
networks.6  Widespread public use has since transformed the 
Internet into a medium for global communication.7  During the 
 
 4. See Ticketmaster (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.ticketmaster. 
com>. 
 5. See First Amended Complaint, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Mircrosoft Corp., 
CV 97-3055 RAP (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 28, 1997) <http://www.ljx.com/LJXfiles 
/ticketmaster/complaint.html> [hereinafter Ticketmaster Complaint]. 
 6. See KIERSTEN CONNER-SAX & ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET: THE 
NEXT GENERATION 4 (1999). 
 7. See id. at 107.  “The World Wide Web, or WWW, is the most popular, 
powerful, and easily navigable portion of the Internet.”  Id. 
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1980s, the U.S. National Science Foundation extended Internet 
access to researchers at universities and colleges throughout 
the country.8  Until the late eighties, Internet use consisted 
only of communication through e-mail messages or 
newsgroups.9  Tim Berners-Lee then revolutionized the 
Internet by inventing the hyperlink,10 and the World Wide Web 
was born.11 
Hyperlinks connect documents on the Internet by 
providing users viewing one Web page direct access to other 
Web pages.  A hyperlink usually appears on an electronic 
document as underlined line of colored text or graphic image.  
When a user clicks on the hyperlink with a mouse pointer 
another electronic document, the “Web page,” opens.  Host 
computers store Web pages and users explore the Internet 
using hyperlinks to link Web page to Web page.12 
Users often use “search engines” such as Yahoo!,13 Google,14 
Infoseek15 and Ask Jeeves16  to locate Web sites containing 
specific information.  Search engines act as databases for 
information contained on Web sites.17  When user types in 
keywords regarding the information or specific type of Web site 
she is looking for, the search engine provides a list of possible 
links, or “addresses,” which normally appear as a hypertext 
links.  By clicking on the particular address, the user’s 
computer displays the contents of the chosen site. 
Each Web page has an address, or Universal Resource 
 
 8. See id. at 5. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. at 6. 
 11. See Kara Beal, Comment, The Potential Liability of Linking on the 
Internet: An Examination of Possible Legal Solutions, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 
705 (1998).  Public servers became available in 1993, and open specifications 
allow the general public to create Web pages.  Ever since the public acquired 
unlimited access to the Internet, the number of Web sites has been increasing 
dramatically.  Approximately 500 Web sites existed in October of 1993.  Six 
years later over two million sites had been created.  See CONNER-SAX & KROL, 
supra note 6, at 107. 
 12. See CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 6, at 107.  Individuals connect to 
the Internet by connecting to a local Internet Service Provider (ISP).  See id.  
Using the telephone line, personal computers link to the server, which allows 
access to information stored on all the computers joined together on the Web.  
See id. 
 13. See supra note 1. 
 14. See Google (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.google.com>. 
 15. See Infoseek (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.infoseek.com>. 
 16. See Ask Jeeves (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.askjeeves.com>. 
 17. See CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 6, at 414. 
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Locator code (“URL”), normally beginning with “http://www.”18  
The address appears across the top of the screen in the 
“location” bar.  By looking at the location bar, a user can 
identify the source of the site she is viewing.  If a user knows 
the address of the site she wishes to view, she can type it in the 
location bar directly and avoid using a search engine. 
Web pages, each one an individual work of authorship, 
contain mainly text and graphics, but may also contain audio 
and video elements.  Owners construct Web sites using 
Hypertext Markup Language (“HTML”).19  Some sites contain 
multiple pages20 and the introductory page, or “home page,” 
acts as a welcome page and a guide to the information 
contained on pages “deeper” in the site.21  Generally, a user who 
clicks on links on the home page can connect to other pages 
within the site; however, each new page has its own Internet 
address, and can be accessed without first entering the site’s 
home page by directly typing the “internal” address.22  Web 
pages also often contain links to other related sites.  By 
entering one site of interest, the user may then continue to 
“surf the Web” and enter an infinite number of other sites 
 
 18. See Shelby Clark, Note, What a Tangled Web We Weave, When First 
We Practice to Deceive: Frames, Hyperlinks, Metatags and Unfair Competition 
on the World Wide Web, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1333, 1335 (1999). 
 19. See CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 6, at 298.  The instructions for 
the Web page design do not appear on the computer screen, but direct the 
browser how to display text, images, and other media aspects of the page.  See 
id.  Using HTML, a designer can make her Web page interactive through links 
to other HTML documents.  See id. 
 20. See Clark, supra note 18, at 1358 n.11.  Commercial Web sites often 
contain multiple pages.  See id.  In a commercial site, the home page acts not 
only as a guide for the rest of the site, but also may contain disclaimer and 
legal information as well as advertising.  See id.  Users view this advertising 
when entering the Web site through the home page, creating revenue.  See id. 
 21. See Beal, supra note 11, at 707. 
 22. See id.  Pages other than the home page of a Web site are often 
described as “internal” pages, located “beyond” the primary page.  See id.  
However, each page is located at its own URL, stored and organized in a non-
linear fashion.  See CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 6, at 107 (“The web does 
not imply a hierarchical tree, which is the structure of most books, nor a 
simple ordered list.  In essence, it allows many possible relations between any 
individual document and others . . . regardless of where the document is 
located.”).  See also Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual 
Property and the National Information Infrastructure 13 (1995), reprinted at 
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure (last 
modified Nov. 15, 1995) <http:// www.upsto.gov/Web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/> 
[hereinafter “White Paper”] (“While conceptualization helps to put in material 
terms what is considered rather abstract, activity on the Internet takes place 
neither in outerspace nor in parallel, virtual locations.”). 
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through the hyperlinks provided, without knowing or searching 
for the addresses.23 
A user may link functions in one of three ways.24  
Hypertext Reference links (“HREF”) direct the browser to 
display the content of another Web site by retrieving the new 
address, which then replaces the address of the first site in the 
location box.25  “IMG” links instruct a browser to display images 
or text from another Web site without leaving the original 
site.26  IMG linking can be accomplished by “framing”27 or 
“inlining.”28  Proxy server links display contents of a Web site to 
which the user has already linked,29 by storing or “caching” the 
contents of the site on the user’s computer, making it available 
 
 23. See Beal, supra note 11, at 739 n.32.  Linking usually occurs without 
the knowledge of the owner of the linked to site.  If a site owner wants to find 
out what other sites contain a link to hers, she can visit 
<http://altavista.digital.com>.  See id.  Typing “LINK: [owner’s URL address] 
generates a list describing where all the links to her site come from.  See id. 
 24. See Peggy Miller, Advertising Law in the New Media Age, 775 PLI 
Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. A0-002M 505, 507 
(1997). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See Charlton D. Rose, Sharky’s Netscape Frames Tutorial Lesson 1: 
Laying Out Frames (visited April 10, 2001)  <http://www.sharkysoft.com/ 
tutorials/frames/1/.htm>.  While HREF links display only one Web page at a 
time, framing allows the user to view multiple pages on the same screen.  See 
id.  A narrow vertical frame containing a list of links to the Web site’s internal 
pages often appears on one side of a Web site’s home page.  See id.  If a user 
clicks on a link, the internal page is retrieved in the main frame and the link 
list remains displayed in the vertical side bar.  See id.  Frames can also be 
used to display information simultaneously for comparison.  See id.  The user 
can interact with only one frame at a time, as each still exists as an 
independent document.  See id.  Furthermore, displaying linked to information 
in a frame allows the original site to continue to display bordering advertising 
information.  See id. 
 28. See Brian Wassom, Copyright Implications of “Unconventional 
Linking” on the World Wide Web: Framing, Deep Linking and Inlining, 49 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 181, 193 (1998).  Inlining occurs when a Web page 
designer incorporates a graphic file from another site into her own page.  See 
id.  When a user retrieves the page, specific HTML language instructs the 
browser to copy an image from another page on the server and incorporate the 
image onto the displayed page.  See id.  The graphic image usually appears in 
a small box outlined in bold color.  See id.  Unlike in the case of HREF links, 
nothing identifies the source of the inlined graphic.  See id.  Unless the user 
deconstructs the HTML coding of the page or the creator alerts the user, the 
user does not know where the individual graphic came from.  See id.  See also 
supra note 19. 
 29. See Miller, supra note 24, at 507. 
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for rapid retrieval.30  In each case, the content of the Web site to 
be viewed must be loaded into the random access memory 
(RAM) of the user’s computer before it can be displayed on the 
screen.31 
According to the court in ACLU v. Reno, “[t]he power of the 
Web stems from the ability of a link to point to any document, 
regardless of its status or physical location.”32  The practice of 
linking developed within the culture of free accessibility to the 
Web33 and, until recently, remained largely unquestioned.34  
While hyperlinks between Web sites create limitless 
accessibility integral to the functioning of the Web and 
augment the ease with which a user may locate information, 
competition for popularity and advertising revenue35 has 
increased Web site owner concern about when and how other 
sites link to theirs.36  Myriad legal issues arise when 
challenging the use of hypertext links.  To date, copyright 
claims on the Internet remain an unsettled and widely 
disputed area of law.37 
 
 30. See Beal, supra note 11, at 708.  The image of the Web page remains 
in the user’s computer’s RAM while the user views the page.  See id.  Web 
browser software also stores a copy of the site, or caches it, on the computer’s 
hard drive for a limited time.  See id.  The cache can store only a limited 
number of sites; as the user visits additional sites, the cache deletes the oldest 
sites and saves the more recently visited.  See id.  If the user revisits a site 
while it is stored in the cache, the browser retrieves the information much 
more quickly from the hard drive than it would by reloading the site from the 
Internet.  See id. 
 31. See Miller, supra note 24, at 507. 
 32. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 117 S. Ct. 
2329 (1997). 
 33. See supra note 11. 
 34. See supra note 5. 
 35. See Beal, supra note 11, at 708-09.  Owners of Web sites requiring 
financial support usually charge advertisers, rather than site users, to 
generate funding.  See id. at 709.  The site owner places the advertiser’s logo 
on a Web page, and every time a user visits the page the advertiser must pay 
the owner a set amount, or per-hit fee.  See id. 
 36. See Robert A. Bourque & Kelly L. Konrad, The Tangled Web: First 
Wave of Internet Cases Provides More Questions Than Answers, 8 No. 11 J. 
PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, (publication page numbers not available) (1996) (“While 
hyperlinks exist most obviously to provide the Internet user with handy, 
efficient cross-references to relevant topics of interest, they also have great 
commercial potential.”). 
 37. Upon hearing of the settlement ending Ticketmaster’s case against 
Microsoft, described below at Part II.E., Jeffrey Kuester, Internet law 
specialist and partner at Thomas, Kayden, Horstemeyer & Risley, responded, 
“[i]’m sure it’s the best interest of the parties, but for the purpose of providing 
meaningful guidance to the Internet community, this is the worst news I’ve 
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II. COPYRIGHT LAW ONLINE 
 
In recent years, the scope of basic copyright law in the 
United States has been expanding through regulation and 
judicial interpretation to encompass unforeseen developments 
in communication technology.38  Current jurisprudence employs 
the fundamentals of copyright law and the exclusive rights it 
confers, the elements of an infringing action, and the elements 
of the fair use defense in the Internet context.39 
 
A. FUNDAMENTALS OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution contemplates the 
existence of a body of law “to promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts.”40  The Copyright Act of 1976 (“Act”) 
establishes a system of copyright protection in the United 
States.  Protection exists for all “original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression,”41 in an effort to 
encourage creation of literary, artistic and technological works, 
and to reward authors for their work.  However, copyright law 
acts as a balance between individual protections and the public 
interest in use and dissemination of creative works.42 
The Act has been amended several times, often in response 
to the developments of advancing technology.43  As technology 
continues to develop, new and unforeseen situations demand 
that courts interpret and apply copyright laws in an equitable 
 
heard all day. . . .We were hoping to hear some good, broad, general language 
from the court. . . . Now, do we know if deep linking is bad?  Is linking to a 
main home page O.K.?  Is it just not O.K. to link?  We don’t know.”  See Bob 
Tedeschi, Ticketmaster and Microsoft Settle Suit on Internet Linking, N.Y. 
Times (Feb. 15, 1999) <http://nytimes.qpass.com/qpass-archives>. 
 38. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 911 (2d  ed. 2000). 
 39. See id. at 911- 1007 (applying copyright law to computer technology). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 42. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 38, at 352. 
 43. See id. at 345-48 (describing the history of copyright law from its 
origin in 1556 to the present). Congress modified the Act in 1980 to 
incorporate computer programs, in 1992 to address digital audio recordings, 
and in 1998 to clarify application in online contexts.  See id.  See also Sony 
Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) (“From its beginning, 
the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in 
technology.”). 
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manner; they must continue to protect the author’s rights and 
provide incentives for creation, and at the same time protect 
the public’s interest in the dissemination of information as 
communication technology explodes.44  Recently, Congress 
enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 
addressing the application of copyright law to online 
technology.45 
 
B. EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
Current copyright law expressly confers six rights to a 
copyright owner.46  Section 106 conveys exclusive rights to 
reproduce the work,47 create derivative works,48 distribute 
copies of the work,49 perform the work publicly,50 display the 
work publicly,51 and perform sound recordings by means of 
digital audio transmission.52  Like other property rights, 
copyright owners may divide their bundle of rights through 
licensing, sale, and other means of alienation.53  While violation 
of any of these rights may constitute infringement, hyperlinks 
are most likely to implicate the right to reproduce work, the 
right to create derivative works, the right to distribute copies of 
the work, and the right to display the work publicly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 38, at 911. 
 45. See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 
Stat. 2860 (1998), codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512.  The DMCA “implements two 
important international treaties of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization,” modifies the application of copyright law to the Internet, and 
“outlaws manufacture of devices or software designed to circumvent protective 
security measures created for the Internet and other electronic environments.”  
Carolyn Andrepont, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 No. 11 DEPAUL-LCA 
J. ART & ENT. L. 397, 398-399 (1999). 
 46. 2 MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
8.01[A] at 8-14 (1963). 
 47. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2001). 
 48. See id. § 106(2) (2001). 
 49. See id. § 106(3) (2001). 
 50. See id. § 106(4) (2001). 
 51. See id. § 106(5) (2001). 
 52. See id. § 106(6) (2001). 
 53. See Wassom, supra note 28, at 194-95. 
2001] SURFING THE WEB FOR COPYRIGHT LAW 81 
 
1. The Right to Reproduce the Work 
 
The right to reproduce a work is the most fundamental 
right granted by copyright law.54  Section 106(1) grants a broad 
right that prevents others from making both exact copies and 
“substantially similar” reproductions.55  Section 101 defines 
“copies” as “material objects . . . in which work is fixed . . .”56  
Although the law prohibits copying, it does not prohibit 
independent creation.  A copyright owner possesses rights to 
the original expression, not the facts, which are considered 
public domain.57  According to the legislative history of §106, 
reproducing the entire work or any substantial part, exactly or 
by imitation, constitutes infringement “as long as the author’s 
‘expression’ rather [than] merely the author’s ‘ideas’ are 
taken.”58 
In the online context, the reproduction right is arguably 
implicated every time an image is reproduced either in a 
central server or in a user’s computer.  Very little case law 
exists concerning “the exclusive right of reproduction of works 
in the context of computer memory” and most of them concern 
computer software.59  In 1993, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that “since . . . the copy created in the RAM 
can be ‘perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated’, . . . 
the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under the 
Copyright Act.”60  However, when browsing the Internet, a 
“copy” exists on the computer screen only as long as the user 
views the page, and on the computer’s hard drive only until the 
cache fills and the earliest viewed sites are erased.61  Since the 
image usually does not even remain in the computer’s memory 
until the computer is turned off, as in MAI Sys. v. Peak,62 such 
 
 54. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 38, at 432. 
 55. See id. at 433. 
 56. 17 U.S.C § 101 (2001). 
 57. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 38, at 433. 
 58. See id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 61 
(1976)). 
 59. See Bruce Keller, Internet and Online Law: Copyright, 610 PLI 
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook 
Series No. G0-00D6 169, 212 (2000). 
 60. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 
1993), cert. dismissed 510 U.S. 1033 (1994). 
 61. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 62. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 
519. 
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use is arguably not “fixed” as required by the statutory 
definition.63  Although a number of courts agreed with the MAI 
Sys. holding,64 prior case law,65 Congressional intent,66 most 
commentators,67 and intuition68 reject this decision.  
Furthermore, Section 117 of the Act, enacted in 1980, permits 
users of computer programs to make certain copies without 
implicating the copyright holder’s reproduction rights.69 
 
 63. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).  The statute states that “a work is ‘fixed’ in 
a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment is a copy or 
phonorecord . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than a 
transitory duration.”  Id. 
 64. See, e.g., Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 
1335 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that loading operating system software into a 
computer’s RAM is copying for the purposes of the Act); Stenograph L.L.C. v. 
Bossard Associates, Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that 
loading software from a permanent storage medium to a computer’s RAM by 
“booting up” causes a copy to be made); Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe 
Specialty, Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d 1113, 1119 (D. Nev. 1999) (holding that scanning 
a photograph into a computer’s RAM violates the reproduction right). 
 65. See Apple Computer v. Formula Int’l. Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 621-22 
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (indicating that copies stored in RAM, unlike those loaded in 
ROM, were only “temporary”). 
 66. The House Report on the 1976 Act states that “the definition of 
‘fixation’ would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient 
reproductions such as those captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a 
computer.”  H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976). 
 67. See, e.g., MERGES ET AL., supra note 42, at 968; Niva Elkin-Koren, 
Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The 
Case Against Copyright Liability of Internet Providers, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 345, 381-382 (1995); Michael E. Johnson, Note, The Uncertain 
Future of Computer Software Users’ Rights in the Aftermath of MAI Systems, 
44 DUKE L.J. 327 (1994); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and 
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1280 n.184 (1995); Katrine 
Levin, Note, MAI v. Peak: Should Loading Operating System Software into 
RAM Constitute Copyright Infringement?, 24 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 649 
(1994); Jessica Litmas, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 29, 41-42 (1994); Carol G. Stovsky, Note, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak 
Computer, Inc.: Using Copyright Law to Prevent Unauthorized Use of 
Computer Software, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 593 (1995). 
 68. Under MAI, every use of a computer involves making copies.  See 
MERGES ET AL., supra note 38, at 968.  It would be impossible for a computer 
to read and implement a program without making a copy; such application of 
copyright law, while protecting a copyright owner’s interest, obliterates the 
public’s interest in dissemination and use of the work.  See id. (“While you can 
‘use’ a book without making a copy, under MAI any use of a computer 
program- even turning the computer on- necessarily implicates the copyright 
laws.”). 
 69. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2001).  Section 117 states that “it is not an 
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make. . . 
another copy. . . provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as 
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2. The Right to Create Derivative Works 
 
A copyright owner also has the exclusive right to prepare 
derivative works.70  In order to be considered a derivative work, 
the new work must contain an element of originality and be 
made by, or with the permission of, the true copyright owner.71  
Furthermore, a derivative work must add a new expressive 
element to the original work and serve markets that differ from 
the market in which the original work was introduced.72  The 
level of originality required in the new work for the courts to 
consider it a derivative work is more than “merely trivial.”73  
Infringement occurs when a third party “recast[s], transform[s] 
or adapt[s]”74 a work without the authorization of the copyright 
owner. 
According to the Fourth Annual Internet Law Institute, 
simply digitizing a work does not create a derivative work, as 
“such techniques are essentially techniques of copying.”75  The 
courts have addressed the question, however, of whether 
modification of an existing digital work by simply adding a new 
 
an essential step in the utilization of the computer program. . . or (2) that such 
new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival 
copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer 
program should cease to be rightful.”  Id.  The Congressional intention in 
enacting § 117 “seems to be to allow copies such as those made in MAI v. 
Peak.”  MERGERS ET AL., supra note 38, at 969.  Title III of the DMCA altered 
this provision to expressly exempt from liability the owner or lessee of a 
computer to make a copy of a computer program for purposes of maintaining 
or repairing computer hardware only.  See Keller, supra note 59, at 213. 
 70. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2001).  Section 101 of the Act defines a 
“derivative work” as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such 
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion 
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, 
or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.  A 
work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaboration, or other 
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 
‘derivative work’.”  17 U.S.C. §101 (2001). 
 71. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2001). 
 72. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc. 704 F.2d 1009, 1013-14 (7th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 923 (1983). 
 73. Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Meta-
Tags: An Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA 243, 254 (1998) (“The level of 
originality required does vary among the United States Courts of Appeals, 
leading to uncertainty as to how the law will apply to the new medium of the 
Web.”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Keller, supra note 59, at 214. 
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component to that work creates a derivative work.76  The court 
in Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., determined that adding 
a Artic-manufactured computer chip, which was used to speed 
up an arcade video game manufactured by Midway, infringed 
on Midway’s copyright by creating a derivative work.77  On the 
contrary, the court in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of 
Am.,78 ruled that the Game Genie, a computer game add-on 
that altered characteristics of games played on a home video 
game unit, does not infringe, as it does not incorporate any part 
of the original work.79  The Galoob court distinguished the 
Game Genie from Artic’s chip; noting that Game Genie involved 
no direct copying from a computer’s ROM and that it is used in 
a private, non-commercial setting.80  In dicta, the Galoob court 
stated that “derivative works should not encompass works 
whose sole purpose is to enhance the underlying work.”81 
 
3. The Right to Distribute Copies of the Work 
 
Another right that may arise in the Internet context is the 
right of distribution.  Section 106(3) grants the copyright owner 
the right to distribute, through sale or other means, original 
and subsequent copies of the copyrighted work.82  Infringement 
of the distribution right requires that a third party actually 
disseminate copies of the original work.83  A distributor of 
unauthorized copies may be liable for copyright infringement 
even if she did not make the copies herself.84 
In the Internet context, disseminating a document on the 
Web may implicate the distribution right.  Link creators have 
been held liable for infringement if the link is used to retrieve a 
 
 76. See  MERGERS ET AL., supra note 38, at 976-1007 (discussing fair use 
and derivative works as applied to computer software.) 
 77. See Midway Mfg. Co., 704 F.2d at 1013. 
 78. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 79. See id. at 968 . 
 80. See id. at 969. 
 81. Matt Jackson, Linking Copyright to Homepages, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 
731, 748 (1997).  See also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 964 F.2d at 659 (“The Game 
Genie is useless by itself, it can only enhance, and cannot duplicate or recast, a 
Nintendo game’s output.”). 
 82. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2001). 
 83. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.11[A], at 8-149. 
 84. See MERGER ET AL., supra note 38, at 470. 
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Web site that distributes infringing copies of works.85  The 
distribution right, however, has been interpreted to apply to 
“material objects, which are arguably distinct from the signals 
sent in transmissions.”86  Courts have been inconsistent in the 
application of the statutory right to public distribution with 
regard to electronic transmissions.87  The Working Group on 
Intellectual Property Rights of the United States addressed 
this uncertainty and proposed that works distributed 
electronically should be treated no differently from work 
distributed physically.88  Despite these recommendations, the 
DMCA did not “change the law with respect to many 
transmissions that implicate the exclusive distribution rights of 
copyright owners,”89 as it mandates a licensing scheme relating 
specifically to online transmissions of sound recordings only.90 
 
4. The Right to Display the Work Publicly 
 
The fourth right that hyperlinks may arguably implicate is 
the exclusive right of public display.  Section 101 defines 
“display” as “to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of 
film, slide, television image, or any other device or process or, 
in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to 
show individual images nonsequentially.”91  Such display must 
occur: 
at a place open to the public or at any place where a 
substantial number of persons outside of a normal 
circle of family and its social acquaintances is 
 
 85. See Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 
F.Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 2000) (holding that providing links to a Web site 
that contains infringing copies of the Mormon Church handbook constitutes 
contributory infringement). 
 86. Keller, supra note 59, at 227 n.12. 
 87. See Agee v. Paramount Comm. Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 324-25 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(holding that a satellite transmission of sound recordings does not constitute 
distribution) and Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932-33 
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that the uploading and downloading of software 
infringes reproduction right, with no finding made with respect to public 
distribution rights).  But see Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 
1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that operators of an Internet bulletin 
board service from which copyrighted pictures were viewed and downloaded 
constitutes infringement of public distribution rights). 
 88. See White Paper, supra note 22, at 213-17. 
 89. Keller, supra note 59, at 217. 
 90. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114 (2001). 
 91. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2001). 
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gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise 
communicate. . . to a place specified by clause (1) or to 
the public, by means of any device or process.92 
Clause (2) covers all broadcasts or transmissions, even if 
all possible recipients do not view the work, or do so 
individually, in the privacy of their own home.93 
Like infringement of the right to distribution, infringement 
of the right to public display may occur in the absence of 
copying the work.94 Posting and viewing documents on the 
Internet may involve copyright liability for violation of an 
owner’s exclusive display right.  Like many aspects of 
potentially infringing situations on the Web, the “significance 
of the right of public display . . . to the online environment has 
not been addressed in detail in the decisional law to date.”95  
The “White Paper” declares that browsing the Web and viewing 
works online constitutes a public display, but offers no 
explanation for its decision.96  According to the Fourth Annual 
Internet Law Institute, the assumption underlying the White 
Paper’s determination “is that all browsing requires copying in 
RAM, which fixation, it concludes, is a reproduction under 
current case law.”97 
 
C. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
 
A claim of copyright infringement can be brought under 17 
U.S.C. § 501.98  To establish direct infringement, a plaintiff 
must prove ownership of a valid copyright, copying by the 
defendant, and improper misappropriation.99  A plaintiff can 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  The transmission of a work constitutes public display “whether 
the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display 
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at 
different times.”  Id. 
 94. See MERGER ET AL., supra note 38, at 478. 
 95. Keller, supra note 59, at 226. 
 96. See White Paper, supra note 22, at 71. 
 97. Keller, supra note 59, at 227 n.52.  See also supra Part I.B.1 
(discussing the viability of claims that loading information into a computer’s 
RAM creates a copy within the meaning of the Act) and Part II.B.1 (discussing 
fixation requirement as an element of “copying”). 
 98. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2001).  The section states in part, “[a]nyone 
who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by 
sections 106 through 121 . . . is an infringer of the copyright or right of the 
author.” Id. 
 99. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d. Cir. 1946). 
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establish the copying element through showings of defendant’s 
access to the original work,100 or that the “two works are so 
strikingly similar as to preclude the possibility of independent 
creation.”101  A plaintiff can establish improper appropriation by 
showing “substantial similarities” in the two works.102  The 
defendant must have interfered with one of the plaintiff’s rights 
granted by §106 in order for the plaintiff to succeed on an 
infringement claim.103  Remedies for infringement liability 
include “an injunction, the impounding and disposal of 
infringing articles, damages and profits, court costs and 
attorney’s fees, and even criminal sanctions against the 
infringer.”104 
In order to find contributory infringement damaging, the 
court first must find that the copyright owner’s rights have 
been directly infringed.105  Personal conduct that furthers, or is 
part of, a copyright infringement constitutes contributory 
infringement, as does supplying machinery or good that provide 
the means for infringement.106  Such infringement occurs when 
“one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, 
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of 
another.”107 
 
D. FAIR USE DEFENSE TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
 
Limitations exist on the exclusive rights afforded to 
copyright owners in 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
Under § 107, “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not 
infringement of copyright.”108  The Copyright Act describes 
certain purposes for which reproducing copies does not 
 
 100. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.01[B], at 13-10. 
 101. Fergusen v. Nat’l Board. Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 102. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.03[A], at 13-27.  
Copying that is negligible in quantity but substantial in quality may 
nonetheless constitute substantial similarity.  Id. 
 103. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 
(1991). 
 104. Rosaleen P. Morris, Note, Be Careful to Whom You Link: How the 
Internet Practices of Hyperlinking and Framing Pose New Challenges to 
Established Trademark and Copyright Law, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 247, 277 (1998). 
 105. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 12.04[A][3][a], at 12-82 to 
12-84. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 108. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001). 
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constitute infringement109 and enumerates four factors the 
court should consider in determining fair use: the purpose and 
character of the use,110 the nature of the copyrighted work,111 
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole,112 and the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.113  The Copyright Acts also lists potential fair uses and 
the factors to be considered in determining fair use are 
“illustrative rather than exhaustive.”114  The Copyright Act also 
provides that no one factor should be considered definitive; 
rather, the court should balance all four in equity.115 
 
1. The Purpose and Character of Use 
 
The first factor to consider in determining the validity of a 
fair use defense to copyright infringement examines the 
purpose of the use of the copied work.116  A court must consider 
not only whether the defendant used the work for a commercial 
or nonprofit purpose,117 but also whether the user stands to 
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without 
paying the customary price.118  The propriety of the defendant’s 
conduct also merits consideration,119 as does whether implied 
 
 109. See id.  The statute contemplates “purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research, is not infringement of copyright.”  Id. 
 110. See id. § 107(1). 
 111. See id. § 107(2). 
 112. See id. § 107(3). 
 113. See id. § 107(4). 
 114. MERGES ET AL., supra note 42, at 490.  According to the House Report, 
both lists serve to “offer some guidance” in judicial determination of a fair use 
defense.  See id. (quoting H.R. No. 9401476, at 66 (1976)). 
 115. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.05[A], at 13-152 to 13-
155. 
 116. See 17 U.S.C § 107(1) (2001). 
 117. See id.  Section 107 states that the character of the use includes 
“whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes.”  Id. 
 118. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566-68 
(1985). 
 119. See id. at 562.  See also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 
13.05[A][1][d], at 13-167 to 13-170, and Jonathan B. Ko, Para-Sites: The Case 
for Hyperlinking as Copyright Infringement, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 361, 377 
(“Intuitively, a use made in bad faith is inconsistent with this privilege 
because an assumption of good faith and fair dealing underlies fair use.”). 
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consent justifies the use.120 
 
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
 
The nature of the copyrighted work is the second 
consideration.  The necessity for an informed society, dictates 
that the public should have greater access to certain public 
works than others.121  Thus, courts recognize a greater need to 
disseminate factual works than fiction.122  Whether the author 
has published the work is a critical component of the 
consideration, since the author’s right to decide when and 
where her work becomes public may outweigh the defense.123  
Courts will also consider the copyright holder’s interest in 
confidentiality and creative control of the work.124 
 
3. The Amount and Substantiality of the Work Used 
 
The third factor listed for consideration in U.S.C.§107 is 
the amount of the work copied.  Courts will consider not only 
the portion of the original work copied in relation to the 
original work as a whole constitutes an important 
consideration, but also the proportion of allegedly infringing 
work the copied material comprises.125  If the portion copied is 
substantially larger than the portion necessary to complete the 
purpose of the defendant’s work, the amount copied will weigh 
against a finding of fair use.126  The factor contemplates not 
only how much of the original work was copied but also the 
import of that aspect of the work.127 
 
4. The Effect on Market Value 
 
 The fourth factor for consideration is the effect of the use 
upon the market for or value of the copyrighted work.128  The 
 
 120. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551. 
 121. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.05[A][2][a], at 13-170 to 
13-171. 
 122. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547-48. 
 123. See id. at 555. 
 124. See id. at 564. 
 125. See id. at 565-66. 
 126. See id. at 564-65. 
 127. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.05 [A][3], at 13-180. 
 128. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2001). 
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Supreme Court has indicated that this factor serves as 
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”129  
The fair use defense is limited to copying by others that which 
does not materially impair the marketability of the allegedly 
copied work.130  A plaintiff may negate the fair use defense by 
showing that should the challenged use become widespread, “it 
would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted 
work.”131  Furthermore, the court may consider not only the 
harm incurred in the market for the original work but also 
harm to the market for derivative works.132 
The fair use defense, in all contexts, “is a highly 
contentious area of law”133 and the balancing of the four factors 
in each case-by-case analysis remains extremely fact-specific.134 
 
E. TICKETMASTER V. MICROSOFT: A CASE FOR ONLINE 
 COPYRIGHT LIABILITY? 
 
Recently, Ticketmaster objected to “deep links”135 
connecting to the ticket purchase order page of its Web site.  
The first legal dispute arose in April of 1997,136 after Microsoft 
created a series of Web sites as online travel guides to certain 
cities throughout the world.137  One site, called Seattle 
 
 129. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556. 
 130. See id. at 568. 
 131. See id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 451, 104 S.Ct. 774, 793 (1984)). 
 132. See id. at 568 (stating that fair use analysis “must take account not 
only of harm to the original but also harm to the market for derivative 
works”). 
 133. Keller, supra note 59, at 203. 
 134. See id. at 231.  Depending on the combination and strength of 
arguments for each factor, a fair use defense may apply to hyperlinking Web 
pages on the Internet.  See id.  For example, “when the reproduction, 
performance or display is made only of a fragment of a work, for a transitory 
period, for noncommercial use and when no downloading occurs, the argument 
that browsing is a fair use would seem particularly strong.”  Id. 
 135. Deep linking occurs when a hypertext link connects to an internal 
page of another Web site, rather than to the site’s home page.  See Beal, supra 
note 11, at 711.  Although the user is aware the link is taking place, she may 
be unaware that she is linking to an entirely new site rather than an internal 
page of the original site. See id.  Some Web site owners, especially owners of 
commercial sites, feel that deep links “defeat a Web site’s intended method of 
navigation.”  Wassom, supra note 28, at 192. 
 136. See supra note 5. 
 137. See id. Other cities include Washington, D.C., Boston, and San 
Francisco. 
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Sidewalk,138 included descriptions of various entertainment 
events in Seattle and provided a hypertext link to the 
Ticketmaster Web page.  Instead of linking to Ticketmaster’s 
home page,139 clicking on the hypertext link transferred the 
user directly to the page on which the user enters a credit card 
number to actually purchase tickets for the particular event.140  
In this manner, a visitor to the Seattle Sidewalk page could 
purchase tickets from Ticketmaster without visiting 
Ticketmaster’s home page and thus avoid exposure to third-
party advertising.141 
As a first attempt to prevent Seattle Sidewalk’s link, 
Ticketmaster’s claim alleged unfair competition and trademark 
infringement; it did not include copyright infringement claims 
and did not mention deep linking.142  After Microsoft filed a 
counterclaim seeking declaratory judgment as to the legality of 
hyperlinking143  Ticketmaster amended its complaint to 
specifically address deep linking as the infringing activity.144  
Unfortunately, rather than force the court to determine 
whether hyperlinks may be created without fear of liability in 
order to “remove any chill from the free workings of the 
Internet,”145 the first Ticketmaster case settled.146 
 
 138. See supra note 2. 
 139. See Ticketmaster (visited April 10, 2001) <http://www.ticketmaster. 
com>. 
 140. See Ticketmaster Complaint, supra note 5.  See also Beal, supra note 
11, at 713 (“When the user arrived at Ticketmaster’s page through the link 
from Seattle Sidewalk, the Ticketmaster [page’s] URL was displayed, and the 
look and feel of the site were different from Seattle Sidewalk.”). 
 141. See id. 
 142. See Ticketmaster Complaint, supra note 5. 
 143. See Kuester & Nieves, supra note 73, at 263.  See also Answer to First 
Amended Complaint, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., CV 97-3055 RAP 
(C.D. Cal. Filed Apr. 28, 1997) (visited April 16, 2001) 
<http://www.ljx.com/LJXfiles/ticketmaster/answer.html> [hereinafter 
Microsoft Answer]. 
 144. See Ticketmaster Complaint, supra note 5 (“Some of Seattle 
Sidewalk’s links have circumvented the beginning pages of Ticketmaster’s 
Web site, which display advertisements, products and services of entities with 
which Ticketmaster contracts, and have liked directly to subsidiary pages of 
the Web site.”).  By narrowing the claim to infringement by use of deep links, 
Ticketmaster acknowledges hyperlinks to its home page may not create a 
cause of action.  See id. 
 145. Kuester & Nieves, supra note 73, at 263 (quoting Microsoft Answer, 
supra note 143). 
 146. See Tedeschi, supra note 37.  Although the parties did not disclose the 
settlement terms, the Seattle Sidewalk site changed it’s link to connect to 
Ticketmaster’s home page.  See id.  It appears from the agreement that 
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In a subsequent claim against Tickets.com filed in July of 
1999,147 Ticketmaster chose to include claims of copyright 
infringement based on the reproduction right.148  In conjunction 
with other cases that have recently arisen claiming copyright 
infringement,149 Ticketmaster’s addition of copyright 
infringement to its legal complaint represents the belief that 
hypertext linking, especially deep linking, constitutes a viable 
claim of copyright infringement. 
Ticketmaster’s suit against Microsoft pertained to a deep 
link to an order form page.150  Since copyright protects ideas 
and expression, not facts and forms,151 the specific page in 
question may not even contain copyrightable material.152  
Many, indeed most, Web pages do contain copyrightable 
material, including other pages in Ticketmaster’s site.  
Unfortunately, “the on-line industry remains without legal 
guidelines on the practice of so-called deep linking, of which 
Microsoft was by no means the only practitioner.”153 
 
 
 
 
 
Ticketmaster was satisfied as long as no deep linking occurred, although no 
precedent-setting decision was reached by the court.  See id. 
 147. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Ticketmaster Corp. 
v. Tickets.com, WL 1887522 at * 1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).  Although the 
California Central District Court found that hypertext linking by itself does 
not create copies, and does not constitute copyright infringement, see id., the 
Utah District Court found contributory infringement for creating links to site 
containing a church document.  See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint, 
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, WL 525390 at *2 (C.D. Cal. March 27, 
2000) (“The motion to dismiss the first claim (copyright infringement) is 
denied because the complaint alleges actual copying.”). 
 149. See, e.g., What the Judge said in the Shetland Times Case, SHETLAND 
NEWS (Oct. 24, 1996) <http://www.shetland-news.co.uk/opinion. 
html> (opinion granting interim interdict); Washington Post Co. v. Total 
News, Inc., 97 Civ. 190 (PLK) (S.D.N.Y., complaint, filed Feb. 20, 1997); and 
United Media’s Second Letter (Feb. 3. 1998) (visited April 10, 2001) 
<http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~dwallach/dilbert>. 
 150. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Wassom, supra note 28, at 215. 
 153. Tedeschi, supra note 37.  All of the cases mentioned in note 149 also 
settled without reaching a decision on the merits.  See generally Beal, supra 
note 11.  “There is no direct precedent for the copyright issues that arise in 
these contexts, and no mention in the copyright statutes of how to apply 
copyright law to the Internet.”  Id. at 722. 
2001] SURFING THE WEB FOR COPYRIGHT LAW 93 
 
III. HYPERLINKS DO NOT CREATE A CASE FOR 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
 
If Ticketmaster had decided to raise a copyright claim in 
the Microsoft suit (assuming that the linked-to page was 
copyrightable), as the owner of the linked-to Web site (“owner”) 
it would have had to first decide who was liable for such 
infringement: the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”), the creator 
of the Web site containing the contested link (“link creator”), or 
the individual user browsing the Web (“user”).  Although the 
claims described above were actually brought against the link 
creator, careful consideration of each of the actors who are 
potentially liable for infringement demonstrates that the ISP, 
the link creator, and the user all may likely use HREF links, 
including deep links, without violating current copyright law.154 
 
A. A VALID COPYRIGHT CLAIM DOES NOT EXIST AGAINST THE 
 INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER 
 
A local Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) connects 
individuals to the Internet.155  While it is possible that a 
plaintiff such as Ticketmaster may identify an ISP as an 
infringer, it is unlikely since Title II of the DMAC, entitled the 
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation, “contains 
several ‘safe harbor’ provisions for ISPs.”156  Limitations on 
liability exist in four areas: “1) transitory communication, 2) 
system caching, 3) storage of information on either systems or 
networks as the direction of users, and 4) information location 
tools.”157  As long as the ISP falls into the categorical 
definition,158 the server may not be liable if it implements a 
 
 154. This note addresses whether or not HREF hypertext links create a 
viable action for copyright infringement.  It does not apply to IMG links 
involving inlining or framing.  See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 156. Andrepont, supra note 45, at 412. 
 157. Id. 
 158. In order to qualify as a “service provider,” with regard to the 
limitation on “transitory communications,” the provider must be “an entity 
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connection for the digital 
online communications, . . . without modification to the content of the material 
as sent or received.”  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 
112 Stat. 2860 § 512 (1998).  Qualifications with regard to the other 
limitations define a provider as “a provider of online services or network 
access, or the operator of facilities therefor.”  Id. 
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policy for terminating accounts of subscribers who repeatedly 
infringe copyrights and supports technological measures used 
to protect copyrights.159  Section 512(d) specifically addresses 
“hyperlinks, online directories, and search engines.”160  The ISP 
will not be held liable, regardless of actual knowledge that the 
material or activity is infringing, as long as it does not directly 
receive a financial benefit from infringing activity, and, if when 
alerted to the infringing material, it removes or disables the 
material that is claimed to be infringing.161  The Act “provides 
that a service provider will not be liable for any monetary, 
injunctive or other equitable relief, as long as the listed 
conditions are met.”162  Because of safeguards specifically 
created by the DMCA for ISPs, the owner would be unable to 
prevail on a claim of infringement. 
 
B. A VALID COPYRIGHT CLAIM DOES NOT EXIST AGAINST THE 
 LINK CREATOR 
 
When suing for copyright infringement, the copyright 
owner would most likely name the link creator as the infringing 
party.  The owner could file a complaint based on direct 
infringement and could also assert contributory infringement, 
claiming that the link created provides the means for 
infringement by the user. 
 
1. The Link Creator Does Not Directly Infringe Any 
 Copyrights 
 
In order to establish direct infringement, the court must 
find copying by the defendant and improper misappropriation 
of the work.163  By providing an HREF, the link creator must 
interfere with one of the owner’s statutory rights, which include 
the right to reproduce the work, the right to create derivative 
copies of the work, the right to distribute copies of the work, or 
the right to distribute the work.164 
 
 159. See Andrepont, supra note 45, at 413. 
 160. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
§ 512 (1998). 
 161. See Andrepont, supra note 45, at 417. 
 162. Id. at 415. 
 163. See supra Part II.C (discussing direct and contributory copyright 
infringement). 
 164. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. 
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a. The Link Creator Does Not Directly Infringe the 
 Right to Reproduce the Work 
 
The most fundamental right created by copyright law is 
the exclusive right to reproduce one’s work.165  The fundamental 
question is: Who is actually reproducing the work?166  Microsoft 
asserted that Ticketmaster’s complaint “is based on a 
fundamental fiction.  Ticketmaster creates an illusion that 
Microsoft, not the Internet user, is accessing Ticketmaster’s 
Web pages.”167 Microsoft has only placed the URL of 
Ticketmaster’s purchasing page on the Seattle Sidewalk Web 
site as a hyperlink.168  By clicking on the HREF link, the user 
directed her computer to leave Seattle Sidewalk, connect to the 
Ticketmaster site, and retrieve the purchase order page.169 The 
link creator does not reproduce any part of the owner’s work, it 
merely provides an interested user the Internet address of 
another useful site.  Moreover, the URL itself does not contain 
expression, but only fact, which is not copyrightable material.170  
Therefore, the link creator’s page does not create copy of the 
owner’s site and does not directly infringe on the owner’s 
reproduction right. 
 
b. The Link Creator Does Not Directly Infringe the Right to 
 Create Derivative Works 
 
The owner might claim that the link creator is modifying 
the original work by creating a hypertext link to an internal 
Web page, and in doing so, creating a derivative work.171  Since 
the link creator is not creating a copy of the owner’s Web page 
as stated above,172 the link creator is doing nothing more than 
 
 165. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
 166. The law prohibits making both copies and substantially similar 
reproductions.  See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 167. Microsoft Answer, supra note 139, at 46. 
 168. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. The URL appeared in the 
location bar as: <http://www.ticketmaster.com>. 
 169. See  supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra notes 57-58.  Even if the URL contains the name of the Web 
page, names and titles are not generally copyrightable.  See id. 
 171. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra Part III.B.1.a (explaining that the link creator does not 
directly infringe copyrights because the link creator does not reproduce the 
original work). 
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adding a method for the user to access the owner’s Web page.  
Hyperlinks may be analogized to the Game Genie created by 
Galoob, which the court held did not create a derivative work.173  
Just as the Game Genie is physically attached to a Nintendo 
video game, the link creator’s hypertext link “attaches,” 
superficially through HTML, to the owner’s page.  Both the 
Game Genie and hypertext links are useless by themselves; 
neither functions in the absence of the original work.174  
Furthermore, hyperlinks entail no direct copying and are used 
in a private setting, two factors which were considered to be 
important in the Galoob decision.175  By creating a hypertext 
link to the owner’s Web page, the link creator does not create a 
derivative work. 
 
c. The Link Creator Does Not Directly Infringe the Right to 
 Distribute Copies of the Work 
 
Copyright owners retain the right to distribute both the 
original work and subsequent copies of the work.176  The link 
creator’s hyperlink does not create a copy of the owner’s work177 
and therefore possesses nothing to distribute.  However, 
infringement of the distribution right does not require that the 
distributor make the unauthorized copies.178  The owner may 
argue that though the user creates the copies, the link creator’s 
site does the distributing.  The theory that the link creator 
distributes anything contains two flaws.  First, it operates on 
the assumption that distribution can occur before copying, 
which is logically unsound; second, it confuses providing 
directions with providing the actual web page contents, since 
the link on the link creator’s site does nothing more than 
provide the user with the address of the owner’s Web page. 
The information provided by Internet hyperlinks can be 
compared to information provided by telephone information 
services.  Using the Ticketmaster hypothetical, suppose the 
user wants to purchase concert tickets by phone.  She calls 
 
 173. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 174. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra Part III.B.1.a (explaining that the link creator does not 
directly infringe copyrights because the link creator does not reproduce the 
original work). 
 178. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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Information and requests Ticketmaster’s phone number.  The 
operator will provide it, as long as it is listed in the city’s 
directory. The user may then reach Ticketmaster either by 
hanging up the phone and dialing the number or requesting 
that the operator connect her directly.  Here, Ticketmaster 
chose to post its Web page on the Internet, just as it chose to 
list its phone number in the directory.  Microsoft, akin to the 
Information operator, provides the URL address that the user 
is looking for, then the user makes the decision whether to click 
on the address directly, type it into the location bar, or ignore it 
altogether.  The link creator does not control whether, or by 
what means, the user reaches the owner’s Web page.  If the 
owner would like to stop distributing its Web page, it may 
remove the document from the server or otherwise protect it.  
In creating the hyperlink, the link creator does not directly 
infringe the owner’s right to distribute either the original work 
or copies thereof.179 
 
d. The Link Creator Does Not Directly Infringe the 
 Right to Display the Work Publicly 
 
Suppose that while browsing the Internet, the user visits 
the link creator’s Web site.  With one click on the HREF link, 
she suddenly finds her computer displaying a page of the 
owner’s Web site.  The URL of the specific page appears in the 
location bar and the user is no longer “at” the link creator’s 
site.180  Thus, the computer displays the owner’s Web page 
itself, not the owner’s Web page on the link creator’s site.  The 
link creator is not directly infringing by displaying the 
copyrighted work in a public place, which is the definition of 
public display under § 101, clause (1).181 
Clause (2) of the definition, however, includes transmission 
of the work.182 Even assuming that the Information 
Infrastructure Task Force’s White Paper is correct in asserting 
 
 179. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  It is worth noting, 
however, that if the link creator created a link to a Web page that distributed 
infringing copies of copyrighted works, a case of contributory infringement 
may exist.  In that case the owner of the linked to site, would be the actor 
liable for direct infringement, so it is unlikely that she would bring a suit 
against anyone else.  See id. 
 180. See supra Part I (describing the technical process of hyperlinking). 
 181. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
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that works viewed online constitute public displays,183 the 
Ticketmaster Web site transmits its Web pages to the user’s 
computer at the user’s request.  Ticketmaster, not Microsoft, 
displays the document by placing it on the server,184 so 
Microsoft cannot be liable for direct infringement of 
Ticketmaster’s public display right. 
 
2. The Link Creator Does Not Contributorily Infringe 
 Copyrights 
 
While the link on the creator’s site does not directly 
infringe the owner’s copyright, the owner may claim that the 
link creator is liable for contributory infringement for providing 
the means for others to infringe.185  In order to find contributory 
infringement, the owner would have to prove that the link 
creator knew of the infringement, the users in fact used the 
link to connect to the owner’s Web page, the user was 
committing direct infringement due to the hyperlink, and the 
link substantially contributed to the direct infringement.186 
Returning to the Ticketmaster hypothetical, Microsoft 
created the link so users could connect to Ticketmaster and 
purchase tickets, so the court might assume that Microsoft 
knows that users are clicking on the hyperlink, satisfying the 
second requirement.  Although a user may view the same Web 
page by directly typing in the URL, Ticketmaster could possibly 
substantially contribute to infringement, by claiming that the 
link substantially contributed to the direct infringement; since 
Microsoft enables at least some users to enter the Ticketmaster 
site, the court might conclude that it contributes substantially 
to the conduct of the linking user, albeit a difficult assertion to 
prove.  Ticketmaster would have to prove, however, that the 
user directly infringes its rights in order to satisfy elements one 
and three to prevail on a contributory infringement claim. 
 
 
 
 
 183. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra Part III.B.1.c (explaining that the link creator does not 
directly infringe because the link creator does not distribute copies of the 
work). 
 185. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 186. See Keller, supra note 59, at 236.  See also supra notes 105-107 and 
accompanying text. 
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C. A VALID COPYRIGHT CLAIM DOES NOT EXIST AGAINST THE 
 INTERNET USER 
 
If linking from the link creator’s Web site to the owner’s 
page constitutes direct infringement by the Internet user, the 
owner would have a cause of action every time her Web page 
gets a “hit” without the user normally typing the owner’s URL.  
Ticketmaster, however, does not want to discourage users from 
purchasing tickets online, only from purchasing tickets from 
the order page via deep link, bypassing third party advertising 
on the rest of the Ticketmaster site.  Thus, Ticketmaster would 
not have brought an action if the link had been to the home 
page rather than the order page.  Bringing a cause of action of 
contributory infringement against the link creator, rather than 
the user, Ticketmaster not only avoids alienating its target 
market but also has a much better chance of confronting a 
defendant with deep pockets, such as Microsoft.  In order to 
prevail on contributory claims, however, the owner must still 
prove that the users directly infringe its copyright.187 
 
1. The Internet User Does Not Directly Infringe Copyrights 
 
The owner of a linked-to Web page is unlikely to be able to 
prove that Internet users directly infringe copyrights.  Even if 
the court determines that the user’s computer does reproduce 
the work, a user is still likely to prevail on either an implied 
license or a fair use defense. 
 
a. The Internet User Does Not Directly Infringe the Right to 
 Reproduce the Work 
 
When clicking on the HREF link on the link creator’s Web 
site, the user’s computer contacts the ISP, which retrieves the 
data for the owner’s URL from the user’s server and displays it 
on the user’s screen.  In order to display the owner’s page, it 
must be stored in the user computer’s RAM.188  If the court 
considers that the RAM storage of the Web page constitutes 
copying, it necessarily has determined that such storage meets 
the “fixation” requirement of the Copyright Act,189 though the 
 
 187. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra notes 59-69. 
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information is normally erased from the RAM when the user 
shuts down the computer, if not before.190  The DMCA has been 
interpreted to “confirm[] that a temporary copy of a copyrighted 
work made automatically by a computer when browsing [the 
Web] is not considered an infringing copy.”191 Any other 
interpretation would lead to the absurd result that every user 
surfing the Internet directly infringes copyright law every time 
she views a Web page.  Thereby making every link creator 
liable for contributory infringement.  Without hyperlinks, the 
Internet would cease to be a seamless Web of interconnected 
documents,192 but rather would be reduced to a complicated 
array of isolated works, accessible only to those who know the 
specific URL of the site they would like to view. 
 
b. The Internet User Does Not Directly Infringe the Right to 
 Create Derivative Works 
 
By linking to the owner’s Web page, an Internet user does 
not create a derivative work.  She views the owner’s page on 
her computer screen, as the owner has displayed it on the Web, 
without adding any original expressive element.193  Just as the 
link creator does not directly infringe the right to create a 
derivative work,194 the user does not violate the owner’s 
exclusive right to create derivative works simply because she 
reaches the site through a hyperlink. 
 
c. The Internet User Does Not Directly Infringe the Right to 
 Distribute Copies of the Work 
 
The only way the user could violate the right to distribute 
copies of the owner’s work is by printing the Web page and 
distributing it physically.195  The same reasoning applies as 
used above with regard to the link creator, that viewing the 
Web page does not create the copy, but rather subsequent 
 
 190. See id. 
 191. Roarty, supra note 148, at 1039 (quoting Karen S. Frank, Cable 
Online Liability in Cable Television Law 1999, 245, 265 [PLI]). 
 192. See supra Part I (describing how the Internet functions). 
 193. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra Part III.B.1.a (explaining that the link creator does not 
directly infringe copyrights because the link creator does not reproduce the 
original work). 
 195. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. 
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actions of the user that are unforeseeable and unrelated to 
Internet hyperlinking.196  The Internet user does not directly 
infringe the owner’s distribution right through use of a 
hyperlink. 
 
d. The Internet User Does Not Directly Infringe the Right to 
 Display the Work Publicly 
 
The right to display one’s work publicly protects a 
copyright owner from unauthorized display of her work.  
Ticketmaster Online provides a Web page from which event-
goers may purchase tickets.  Ticketmaster displays the 
document on the Web, and the user views it, and possibly 
interacts with it, fulfilling Ticketmaster’s goal.  The user 
neither places the page on display nor transmits the document 
to anyone else; by linking to the owner’s page, the user does not 
implicate the owner’s right to display its work. 
 
2. Fair Use Defense Protects Internet User from Copyright 
 Infringement 
 
Although the legal issues concerning whether the user 
directly infringes the owner’s right to reproduce the work 
remain unsettled,197 a court would likely find that the fair use 
exception applies to the user viewing copyrighted Web sites 
retrieved by hyperlinks.  Even if a court holds that copies are 
made in the user’s RAM,198 “the online world facilitates and 
even requires the infinite creation of [such] copies.”199  
Consideration of the four factors used to determine the validity 
of a fair use defense demonstrate that the user would likely be 
found not liable for direct infringement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 196. See supra Part III.B.1.c (explaining that the link creator does not 
directly infringe because the link creator does not distribute copies of the 
work). 
 197. See supra Part III.B.1.a (explaining that the link creator does not 
directly infringe copyrights because the link creator does not reproduce the 
original work). 
 198. See id. 
 199. Roarty, supra note 148, at 1038. 
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a. The Purpose and Character of the Use 
 
The first factor a court considers in determining fair use is 
the purpose of the use of the copyrighted work.200  The Internet 
is commonly characterized as harboring unbridled potential for 
disseminating information.  The Internet’s unprecedented 
growth since its inception demonstrates that it not only exists 
as an effective, cost efficient, accessible method for conveying 
information, but that users do actually engage in 
cyberactivities frequently and with vigor.  The Internet serves 
a host of functions, ranging from personal, academic, and 
educational to enjoyable, informative, and commercial.  The 
court must consider copyright claims in the context in which 
they appear.  When dealing with on-line activities concerning 
publicly displayed documents, society’s First Amendment 
interest in obtaining and disseminating information trumps 
individuals’ interests in copyright. 
In a more fact-specific context, the Ticketmaster example, 
the user visiting the Seattle Sidewalk Web site presumably 
searches for information useful in planning her trip or learning 
more about the city.  Although the user may purchase tickets 
by visiting the Ticketmaster page and completing a commercial 
transaction, she is not using the information for a commercial 
purpose; that is, the user does not profit from the copyrighted 
material without paying the customary price.201  The user’s 
purpose for allegedly copying the work is viewing Internet Web 
pages, which has been called “the functional equivalent of 
reading, which does not implicate copyright laws and may be 
done by anyone in a library without the permission of the 
copyright owner.”202 
Ticketmaster bases its objections to deep linking on the 
argument that by entering its site directly at the order page, 
rather than through the home page, the user avoids viewing 
paid advertising throughout the site.  If the link creator 
purposely misleads the user, or intentionally diverts the user 
from the owner’s home page for her own financial gain, courts 
will consider a high degree of bad faith as weighing against a 
finding of fair use, as the defense is consonant with moral 
 
 200. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text. 
 202. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv., Inc., 
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1378 n.25 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Netcom II). 
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rights and fair dealing.203  If the link creator does not attempt to 
conceal the origin of the owner’s page, nor claim the page as its 
own, a finding of bad faith would be unwarranted considering 
the benefits of the hyperlink.  In the situation where URL of 
the owner’s page appears in the location bar, or even in the 
more extreme situation where the link creator actually 
attempts to pass off the owner’s page as its own, the propriety 
of the link creator’s actions is not at issue.  The merit of user’s 
conduct is to be considered, and the purpose of browsing the 
Internet using links is to obtain information easily and 
expeditiously.  The nature of the use of the copied work weighs 
in favor of the user, as does the implied consent of the owner, 
since “ordinary accessing of web sites itself involves the 
repeated reproduction of material placed on and intended to be 
accessed over the web.”204 
 
b. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
 
The court considers the nature of the copied work as the 
second factor of a fair use defense.205 Although the Court has 
determined that the public interest is greater in receiving 
factual information than fictional,206 the nature of the medium 
itself indicates that all Web sites should be equally accessible.  
The Web thrives on user interaction; its sole function is to act 
as a forum for public works, voluntarily published for 
widespread public access and dissemination,207 like a pile of 
fliers left in a park for the public to pick up and read.  The 
owner obviously created its Web site in anticipation that 
Internet users will view it and possibly interact with it.  By 
publishing information on the Web and making it freely 
accessible by hyperlinks, the owner cannot claim violation of its 
right to control an unpublished work,208 nor can it claim an 
interest in confidentiality.209  Furthermore, a deep link does not 
change the nature of the work, but, like any link,  “facilitates 
 
 203. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 204. Michael Zimmerman, Copyright in the Digital Electronic 
Environment, in 1998 UNDERSTANDING BASIC COPYRIGHT LAW 543, 588 (PLI 
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook 
Series No G0-001K, 1998). 
 205. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra Part I. 
 208. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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doing what any Web page invites—reading the page.”210  
Moreover, Ticketmaster itself has developed technology that 
directs the user’s computer to open Ticketmaster’s homepage 
open in a new window anytime a deep link occurs.211  The 
second factor clearly weighs in favor of a finding of the fair use 
defense. 
 
c. The Amount and Substantiality of the Work Used 
 
When the user links to the ticket order page, the page 
specified by the URL is copied in the computer’s RAM.  While 
all of the pages of a Web site may be considered the work as a 
whole, in which case the page copied comprises only a small 
proportion of the work copied, it may also be considered an 
individual work, in which case the computer displays it in its 
entirety.212  While the amount and substantiality of the copied 
work appears to weigh in favor of the owner, the factors are to 
be balanced in equity,213 and the other three factors weigh 
toward a finding of fair use. 
 
d. The Effect on Market Value 
 
The final factor the courts consider is the effect of the use 
on the market for or value of the copyrighted work.214  In the 
Ticketmaster case, which involves a commercial transaction, 
the question may be whether the user’s copying of the purchase 
order page has an effect on the value of the on-line purchasing 
page.  The question may also be whether the user’s copying of 
that particular page has an effect on the value of the Web site 
as a whole.  For purposes of the amount and substantiality of 
the work factor, the owner would argue that the order page 
constitutes a work as a whole, in which case the user’s copying 
 
 210. See Wassom, supra note 28, at 238. 
 211. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 147, at 
*1.  When deciding the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the District Court 
found that there had been significant changes in the circumstances of the case 
since deciding the Motion to Dismiss.  See id.  The Court found that 
“[Ticketmaster] devised technical methods of blocking direct access by “deep 
linking” to [Ticketmaster] interior event pages.”  Id.  The Court also noted that 
Ticketmaster may no longer be able to employ these defensive techniques.  See  
id. 
 212. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
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has no effect on its market.  That is, whether a user reaches the 
page through a deep link directly to it or through a series of 
links through Ticketmaster’s home page, the user will still 
purchase tickets and Ticketmaster will still receive the same 
profit in either situation. 
Deep linking may have an effect on the market, however, if 
the court considers the whole Web site as the work.  
Ticketmaster claims that in bypassing the advertisements 
located on its home page and throughout the site, the user 
deprives it of advertising revenue.215  While it is true that a 
user retrieving the page through a deep link will not view the 
advertisements, Ticketmaster would have a difficult time 
proving that deep linking users would have otherwise seen the 
advertisements or even solicited its Internet purchasing 
services at all.  Ticketmaster’s claim is based on the 
assumption that had the user not linked to the order page 
through the Seattle Sidewalk site, she would have linked to the 
order page by visiting the Ticketmaster home page directly.  It 
is quite possible that she would not have, and only by visiting 
the Seattle Sidewalk site did she happen to arrive at the 
Ticketmaster site.  In this light, hyperlinks, including deep 
links, actually increase the value of the work in two ways.  
First, the link promotes the specific page and leads the user to 
it; second, once a user links to one page of a site, she may 
explore the rest of the site via links provided on the new 
page.216  Despite the fact the user will not initially view the 
advertising on Ticketmaster’s home page by first linking 
directly to the order page, the copying that occurs arguably 
“can only benefit the target page.”217 
Based on the analysis above, the user, searching for 
information on the Web, cannot be held liable for copyright 
infringement.  Even if a court finds that browsing the Internet 
encroaches one of the owner’s statutory rights, it is extremely 
likely that a user would be protected by the fair use defense, 
largely due to the interactive nature of the Internet itself.  
Thus if the user cannot be held liable for direct copyright 
infringement, the link provider cannot be held liable for 
contributory infringement. 
 
 
 
 215. See Complaint, supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Wassom, supra note 28, at 235-38. 
 217. Id. at 237. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Ticketmaster’s hypothetical copyright claim against 
Microsoft for deep linking to its site provides an poignant 
example of how current copyright laws must be interpreted, 
manipulated, and revised when applying it to the mercurial 
medium of Internet communication.  While one of the goals of 
copyright law is to protect the unique expression of authors and 
to encourage creation of literary, artistic and technological 
works, the other is to disseminate information and creative 
works.  Creative and informative Web pages make up the 
seamless Web of the Internet, and hyperlinks facilitate a user’s 
ability to locate and access information.  While Hypertext 
Reference links between Web pages on the Internet may give 
rise to a cause of action in another area of the law, copyright 
claims should be avoided.  In the balance of copyright law, the 
author’s interest in limiting access to unprotected, publicized 
works, is far outweighed by hyperlinks’ contributions to the 
“infinite possibilities and opportunities for the sharing of 
information on a global level.”218 
 
 
 218. Andrepont, supra note 45, at 419-20. 
